Dissecting the Stunning Text of the EU-Iran Nuclear Agreement
Word out of Paris is the stunning text of the EU - Iran nuclear agreement. It is a laughable work of bureaucratic and diplomatic nuance. It is no wonder Iran calls it their 'most positive' nuclear resolution ever.
The unbelievable text complete with The Word Unheard's analysis:
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union (E3/EU), reaffirm the commitments in the Tehran Agreed Statement of 21 October 2003 and have decided to move forward, building on that agreement.
The E3/EU and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the NPT.
At what point did Iran ever truthfully commit to the NPT?
The E3/EU recognize Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination.
What precisely are ‘Iran's rights under the NPT’ ? Also, have they just been officially ordained into the Nuclear Country Club with this language?
Iran reaffirms that, in accordance with Article II of the NPT, it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It commits itself to full cooperation and transparency with the IAEA. Iran will continue to implement the Additional Protocol voluntarily pending ratification.
‘…it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons…’
First, we can dismiss the latter (will not) as a lie because the former (does not) is a proven lie.
Second, if one believes that Iran will do anything (anything) transparently, that same soul likely also believes the holocaust was an illusion. Where is any language that details any procedures of transparency? …Of reliable/enforceable verification?
Third, what is this ‘Additional Protocol’ that Iran will continue to implement? You will see below that neither of them can even say exactly what this will include at this point, as Iran wants to negotiate certain aspects into and out of the ‘Additional Protocol’. Are you beginning to get the sense that the Moon’s atmosphere has more substance?
To build further confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and specifically: the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges; work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any plutonium separation installation; and all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation. The IAEA will be notified of this suspension and invited to verify and monitor it. The suspension will be implemented in time for the IAEA to confirm before the November Board that it has been put into effect. The suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements.
“…The IAEA will be notified of this suspension and invited to verify and monitor it….”
This sounds familiar…North Korean 'agreement'? How did that fare? How will the IAEA know that there is no activity elsewhere? By elsewhere, think outside the box for a moment. To Saddam (and others), elsewhere meant Libya. Is there a ‘Libya’ for Iran to employ? NK? Syria? Pakistan? China? To discount the possibility would be irresponsibly negligent.
The E3/EU recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.
That’s not very comforting. Are there any ‘confidence building measures’ that address the IAEA’s ability to inspect undeclared facilities discovered in the future?
(This is where the ‘Additional Protocol’ is supposed to kick in. It will not. Iran is already laughing about the loophole [previously undeclared sites must be renegotiated anew and are unbound by protocol]. Iran is also laughing at the IAEA after refusing to let them seal their declared centrifuges…just days ago. You know, the ones they signed in the ‘Agreement’ to discontinue using. They need some unsealed declared centrifuges to pull out and show when the US SatIntel picks up the signatures of the undeclared centrifuges operating. Decoys.)
The IAEA-E3-EU are consciously and willfully inserting the terms ‘confidence building’ and ‘good faith’ in the place of what is more aptly described as ‘wishful thinking’.
Sustaining the suspension, while negotiations on a long-term agreement are under way, will be essential for the continuation of the overall process. In the context of this suspension, the E3/EU and Iran have agreed to begin negotiations, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements. The agreement will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It will equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues.
This paragraph is just linguistically beautiful. A Bureaucratic Pulitzer is in line.
E3/EU and Iran have agreed to negotiate to reach an agreement on future agreements. The entire original sentence said nothing. Talking in corporate circles. 'We need to have a meeting to discuss creating a committee to devise plans to be forwarded to a review committee before distribution to the implementation committee...at which point we will have another meeting.'
In an apparent attempt to out-do themselves, the paragraph ended by stating that the goals of the agreement(s) will be ‘objective’ guarantees of ‘peaceful purposes’ but ‘firm’ guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and ‘firm’ commitments on security issues. (Note the use of 'objective' vs. 'firm' and 'guarantees' vs. 'commitments'.)
What does this mean? Iran will tell (objective guarantee) the E3/EU that it has stopped (insert the IAEA of North Korean fame here, if you must). The E3/EU will give (firm guarantee) Iran nuclear know-how and favorable trade agreements...Pay Day…oh, and whatever can be interpreted by ‘firm commitments on security issues’. Security Council vote/veto commitments?
A steering committee will meet to launch these negotiations in the first half of December 2004 and will set up working groups on political and security issues, technology and cooperation, and nuclear issues. The steering committee shall meet again within three months to receive progress reports from the working groups and to move ahead with projects and/or measures that can be implemented in advance of an overall agreement.
Here we see the ‘Do Nothing’ actionless diplomatic-speak again: Committee, working groups, reports from the working groups, projects/measures, agreement.
In the context of the present agreement and noting the progress that has been made in resolving outstanding issues, the E3/EU will henceforth support the Director General reporting to the IAEA Board as he considers appropriate in the framework of the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.
I read that sentence 3 times, thinking I must have misunderstood it. I have not.
What the E3/EU just said is, “We have sat at the table for a long time with the Iranians. What we can agree on, you have just read. What we cannot agree on, we are convinced that they mean well and negotiate in good faith. So, whatever you say from this point forward, Mr. Director General of the IAEA, is fine by us. You figure it out from here. We have secured going forward the 9% of our oil imports that were in the balance. Be nice and don’t screw it up.”
This is also where the afore mentioned ‘Additional Protocol’ is revealed to be a virtually non-existent nothingness. In the case with Iran, the loopholes have a greater specific gravity than the rope of constraint itself within the actual Additional Protocol document. Note that at the IAEA site, there is no specific AP document completed in Iran’s name to date, merely the generic form and Iran’s expressed intent to “…continue to implement the Additional Protocol voluntarily pending ratification.”
If Europe sleeps better at night now, sleep with one eye open.
The E3/EU will support the IAEA Director General inviting Iran to join the Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.
'You must really want to know how this stuff works, Ayatollah. Well, we’ll make you a member of our club! So just come play with us! We’ll teach you!' ...it just keeps getting better and better.
Once suspension has been verified, the negotiations with the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement will resume. The E3/EU will actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations at the WTO.
Worthy of note: The admittance into the Nuclear Country Club is not tied to any suspension verification. Apparently, only Economic Payoff requires this.
Did I miss something?
Irrespective of progress on the Nuclear issue, the E3/EU and Iran confirm their determination to combat terrorism, including the activities of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups such as the MKO. They also confirm their continued support for the political process in Iraq aimed at establishing a constitutionally elected Government.
And finally, we have it. Confirmation that this entire ‘agreement’ is absolutely, wholly and absurdly without merit or value.
Who reads this science fiction without laughing? Did the IAEA hire Ray Bradbury to pen this?
Iran confirms determination to combat terrorism? Including AQ & MKO? What about Hizballah? Hamas? Islamic Jihad (pick a faction: Egyptian, Palestinian, et al)?
Iran confirms their continued support for the political process in Iraq? In July 2004, Iran’s Supreme Guide Ali Khamenehi told a Tehran meeting of Mullahs, “We are at war with the enemy…The central battlefield [of this war] is Iraq."
Anyone with a hint of consciousness realizes that the paragraph should read: ”Iran confirms their continued support of terrorism, including the activities of Al Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas and other terrorist groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. They also confirm their determination to combat the political process in Iraq aimed at establishing a constitutionally elected Government.”
I am speechless. I cannot even find the words to eloquently or properly conclude this analysis.
How about: Dumbfounded.
Special thanks to Regime Change Iran, The Command Post, and Winds of Change for laying down the trail I followed.